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Abstract—Cybercrime investigators face numerous challenges
when policing online crimes. Firstly, the methods and processes
they use when dealing with traditional crimes do not neces-
sarily apply in the cyber-world. Additionally, cyber criminals
are usually technologically-aware and constantly adapting and
developing new tools that allow them to stay ahead of law
enforcement investigations. In order to provide adequate support
for cybercrime investigators, there needs to be a better under-
standing of the challenges they face at both technical and socio-
technical levels. In this paper, we investigate this problem through
an analysis of current practices and workflows of investigators.
We use interviews with experts from government and private
sectors who investigate cybercrimes as our main data gathering
process. From an analysis of the collected data, we identify
several outstanding challenges faced by investigators. These
pertain to practical, technical, and social issues such as systems
availability, usability, and in computer-supported collaborative
work. Importantly, we use our findings to highlight research
areas where user-centric workflows and tools are desirable. We
also define a set of recommendations that can aid in providing a
better foundation for future research in the field and allow more
effective combating of cybercrimes.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the spread of technology and the global reach of the
internet new ways of cyber criminal behaviours are arising
every day. According to Mike Hulett, the head of operations
at Britain’s National Cyber Crime Unit, in 2017 about 50%
of all recorded crimes in the UK involved cyber in some
way. Additionally, around 68% of large UK businesses have
been victims to cyber security breaches or attacks [1]. Law
enforcement is facing numerous difficulties trying to keep the
pace with the increase in numbers and the evolution of tech-
niques used by cyber criminals. Previous studies suggest that
the methods and processes typically used by law enforcement
when investigating traditional crimes do not necessarily apply
in the cyber world [2], [3]. Thus, there is a need to adopt a
different process and build a new set of skills and knowledge
in order to be able to mitigate these technologically advanced
crimes. This is essential mainly as the cyber criminals are
usually technologically-aware and are always adapting and
developing new tools to allow them to stay ahead of law
enforcement investigations [4]–[6].
In this article, we study the current practices followed
by law enforcement, and more generally security intelligence
companies, when investigating cybercrimes and gathering in-
telligence. We aim to identify the general characteristics re-
lated to the investigation process of cybercrimes. This will
allow the identification of empirical socio-technical challenges
currently faced and areas where new technologies, processes,
and workflows are necessary. Identifying these challenges will
lead to formulating user-driven requirements for designing
and building processes and tools to improve the day-to-day
operations of cybercrime investigators. Current cybercrime
research, especially those looking at the technical side, tend
to primarily focus on proposing and developing new solutions
and tools that researchers believe are required by cybercrime
investigators. However, little research in the literature focuses
on understanding the needs and challenges that are actually
being faced by the investigators. The novelty of our work
is in attempting to bridge that gap and thereby set a better
foundation for future research in the field.
To this end, we conduct a qualitative study using a com-
bination of direct questionnaires and semi-structured inter-
views. The questionnaires are used to gather generic infor-
mation about participants role and expertise within the field
of cybercrime, while the interviews gather in-depth data. We
interview ten experts who work on extracting intelligence and
investigating cybercrimes from government and private sectors
in the UK. Participants hold varying roles and responsibilities
including operational and managerial positions. This gives us
diversity in the collected viewpoints and richness in the data.
We use thematic analysis [7] to identify common themes and
patterns that arise from these interviews, and explore these in
the context of our research aim.
In summary, the paper makes the following contributions
to the socio-technical, usable security and cybercrime fields:
1) It establishes an empirical understanding of some of
the key processes used by cybercrime investigators
within government (e.g., police and law enforcement)
and private (security intelligence) sectors.
2) It identifies a set of outstanding and important
challenges (practical, procedural and usability-based)
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faced by investigators while combating cybercrimes
and gathering intelligence. This is useful at directing
future research towards more user-centric approaches,
practices and systems for investigators.
3) It presents recommendations for areas of improve-
ment associated with the processes of intelligence
sharing, reporting cybercrimes, skills and training,
and improving the usability of cybercrime systems.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we begin with defining what is cybercrime
and its main types. We then review related studies on intelli-
gence gathering and policing of cybercrimes.
A. What is Cybercrime?
There have been several arguments in the literature over
the exact definition of cybercrime with no single universal
definition [8]. The European Commission proposed the follow-
ing definition for cybercrime: “criminal acts committed using
electronic communications networks and information systems
or against such networks and systems” [9]. The definition
incorporates crimes that were facilitated by computers and
those that were committed against them. Two main categories
of cybercrimes exist in the literature: these are computer-
enabled, and computer-dependant crimes. The former includes
traditional crimes that can be enhanced in scale and reach using
computers and networks, while the latter includes crimes that
can only be committed using computers and networks [10]. For
example, a phishing attack and denial of service attack are
considered a computer-dependant crime, on the other hand,
cyber-fraud and data theft using hacking, key-logging, and
social engineering are classified as computer-enabled crimes.
B. Intelligence Gathering and Cybercrime Investigations
We reviewed existing research related to the process of in-
telligence gathering. We find that most of the existing literature
focuses on identifying different investigation models to guide
law enforcement through the investigation process [11], [12].
Although these models may seem different as they use different
terminology to define the models’ activities, most of them
have similar processes. As shown in Figure 1 the intelligence
cycle, at its core, consists of six main steps: Planning and
Direction, Collection, Processing and Exploitation, Analysis
and Production, Dissemination and Integration, and Evaluation
and Feedback. The planning and direction step focuses on
identifying what are the questions to be answered and plan the
best course of action to be followed. The collection step deals
with collecting information and data (overtly and covertly)
to help answer the identified questions. The processing and
exploitation step is when the heterogeneous data is reformatted
into a common format for future analysis. The analysis step is
the heart of the intelligence cycle, where the processed data is
fit together in order to find answers and produce intelligence.
The dissemination process is where the analysed data “intel-
ligence” is shared with the intended stakeholders. Finally, the
evaluation and feedback step is where the stakeholders assess
and give their views on the intelligence by either accepting it
or coming back with more questions to answer by repeating
the process.
Fig. 1: The Intelligence Cycle. [13]
While there are many research efforts concentrated on
understanding and analysing the tactics used by cyber crim-
inals [6], [14], [15], very little research exists that focuses
on understanding the processes, challenges, and needs of law
enforcement. Majority of the research literature focuses on
challenges related to the digital forensics side of cybercrime
investigations [16]–[18]. Quick et al., [16] surveys digital
forensic literature on challenges related to data volumes. From
the survey, they concluded that there is still a need for further
research in multiple digital forensic areas. In particular, more
practical solutions that can be applied within the real-world
environment.
In an effort to understand the effects of technology on
policing, the HMIC (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabu-
lary) [19] published a report to study the current readiness
of police services to effectively deal with cybercrimes and
their victims. The main outcomes from the study were related
to providing training, awareness, and guidance for all those
involved with policing cybercrimes. In addition, they recom-
mended raising the level of capabilities within law enforcement
in digital forensics and examining digital devices. Another
study by Hunton et al., [20] focused on identifying different
technical investigation roles needed for policing cybercrimes.
These roles are technical enquirer, network investigator, foren-
sic technician, digital forensic examiner and technical domain
expert. They highlight that when complexity and risk of the
cybercrime increase, the level of specialist technical skills and
knowledge should also increase. Moreover, another study by
Harichandran et al., [21] focused on identifying the needs of
cyber forensic investigators. They conducted a survey of par-
ticipants from different occupations including cyber forensic
students, professors, law enforcement, and practitioners. The
results from the survey suggest that participants indicated that
the main needs include additional funding, advanced tools,
better communication, and revised laws.
A number of previous studies looked at police officers
perceptions regarding cybercrime [22]–[24]. Bossler et al., [22]
investigated how patrol officers’ perceived their role in re-
sponding to cybercrimes, and their current ability to respond
to these offences. The study found that the surveyed patrol
officers in the US felt that local law enforcement should not
be primarily responsible for handling cybercrime cases. Holt
et al., [23] looked at identifying predictors of patrol officer
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interest in cybercrime training and investigation in selected
United States police departments. They identify the officers’
computer skills as one factor influencing their interest in
cybercrime training and investigations. Senjo [24] performed
an exploratory study to gather police officer perceptions of
cybercrimes. The findings pointed that the majority of officers
recognized cybercrime as a serious problem. However, the
perception of the most common type of cybercrime was
different from what has been reported in the literature. Senjo
suggests that these perceptions are influenced by mass media
depictions and stereotypes.
We find that the majority of the literature in this area that
studies how police officers deal with cybercrimes are based
in the US. Very little published literature has investigated
elsewhere in the world, including the UK. [25]. Similarly, the
majority attempted to use surveys with close-ended questions
as a means to collect data. One advantage of using this
approach is collecting answers from a large number of partic-
ipants. However, a disadvantage is that it limits the ability to
capture insights and understand the reasons behind the chosen
answers [23]. Additionally, related literature studied the views
of a particular type of participants dealing with cybercrimes
(e.g., local police officers). Very few looked at this issue from
multiple viewpoints of different participant types (i.e., local
officers, regional and national cybercrime units). In this study,
we address these gaps by interviewing participants dealing
with cybercrimes from government-sector (including local and
regional units) and from the private sector. We aim to identify
the needs and challenges faced by cybercrime investigators
and practitioners using detailed in-depth interviews. In these
expert interviews, we do not only focus on a specific aspect
of the investigation, such as digital forensics, but we look at
the holistic process followed when investigating and therefore
touch on several issues related to technical and human aspects.
III. METHODS
We want to understand the processes, challenges, and
needs associated with investigating cybercrimes and gathering
intelligence. We look at these issues from the perspective of
multiple stakeholders across government and private sectors.
A. Expert Recruitment
We contacted professionals from different types of orga-
nizations, including government and private sectors, since our
aim was to gather the perspectives of multiple organizations
who deal with investigating and mitigating cybercrimes. Partic-
ipants were recruited based on their knowledge and experience
in investigating cybercrimes and gathering intelligence. We
used a snowball sampling approach [26] where we asked initial
participants to recommend candidates from their network. The
recruited participants held different roles; some possessed tech-
nical experience while others held more managerial positions.
This diverse sample of experiences and backgrounds was
important to capture different perspectives.
Reaching out to professionals working in this field was
a difficult task. Many of the individuals we contacted were
very busy and could not afford the time to conduct a full
face-to-face interview. In total, we interviewed ten experts
six from UK law enforcement, four from the private sector,
one of which had ten years of experience working for law
enforcement before moving to join the private sector. A similar
sample size has been used in previous literature (e.g., [27]).
Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, all the participating
organisations and individuals requested to remain anonymous.
B. Data Gathering
In order to gain an understanding of the different socio-
technical challenges and needs associated with investigating
cybercrime incidents, multiple qualitative methods can be used.
Questionnaires, surveys, and interviews are all possible meth-
ods that can be used to achieve this [28]. However, our aim
is to understand the problem in-depth and also the needs from
multiple stakeholders’ perspectives, such as government (law
enforcement agents), and private sectors (security intelligence
and consultancy companies). Additionally, due to the sensitive
nature of this research, it is difficult to gather such detailed
information from experts in the field by general means (e.g.,
surveys) as they are not likely to participate without us gaining
their trust and confidence using direct communication. Simi-
larly, relying on observations would give a rich data, however,
there are many difficulties inherent in observing this kind of
activity directly. Therefore, we rely on participants reports via
a combination of direct questionnaires and interviews to collect
our data.
The questionnaire is used to gather generic information
about participants role and expertise within the field of cyber-
crime. Additionally, it acts as a means for us to assess their
applicability to participate in the interview process. We then
conducted face-to-face semi-structured interviews using open-
ended questions. This allowed the interviewees to elaborate
on their experiences when dealing with different incidents, as
well as providing lengthy and descriptive answers.
The questionnaire focused on multiple themes that aim to
give us a general overview of the participants’ role, expertise,
and technical capabilities. After collecting the questionnaire
responses, we proceeded with conducting the face-to-face,
semi-structured interviews. These interviews ranged from 45-
min to 1.5 hour long, depending on the availability of the
participant and the level of details they were able to provide.
We formed a set of predefined questions informed by our re-
view of the literature to guide the interview, but we also asked
some probing questions when needed [29]. When designing the
interview questions we focused on four main themes. These
themes are described below.
1) Cybercrime Incidents: The focus of this theme was to
understand which types of cybercrime incidents were dealt
with by the respective organization, the volume of incidents
reported, and whether they had the capacity and resources
to investigate all reported incidents. If not all incidents are
investigated, we wanted to identify the filtering or scoring
mechanisms they used to determine which incidents to investi-
gate. Finally, the method by which victims report cybercrimes
and how such interaction occur.
2) Investigation Process: After understanding the types of
incidents investigated we then explored the actual process
used to investigate a given incident. Under this theme, we
collected information on the different tasks performed, if
the investigation process was iterative, and whether it was a
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reactive or proactive process. Understanding the details of the
investigation process will allow us to map the different steps
performed and, identify where applicable, how each step can
benefit from technology adoption.
3) Investigation Team: This theme sought to understand
the dynamics within the investigation team. How big is the
team that works on any single case? What role does each
team member typically have? Are they all located in the same
location? Such questions will allow us to ascertain if there is
a need for processes, systems or tools to support collaborative
investigation sessions. This relates to the field of Computer-
Supported Collaborative Work (CSCW).
4) Tool Support: This theme covered the different tools
currently being used by investigation teams. The aim was to
understand what were the advantages gained from using these
tools, the perceived usability of the tools, their availability, and
effectiveness at supporting the investigation tasks. We also ask
about the perceived limitations of the tools, which is important
to be able to enhance these limitations and give better support
to investigators.
All interviews were audio recorded and then manually tran-
scribed producing transcripts for each participant discussion.
An ethical approval for this study was granted by the central
university research ethics committee. Also, we ensured ethical
handling of collected data through an informed consent pro-
cess for participants, and anonymisation of published results.
Additionally, to ensure the validity of the questionnaire and
the interview questions, we discussed them with a subject
matter expert and incorporated appropriate feedback before
conducting the study.
C. Data Analysis
The data collected from the questionnaires consist of open-
ended text (e.g., participant’s role) and categorical data (e.g.,
types of cybercrimes). The categorical data was analysed using
descriptive statistics by calculating the frequencies for each
category. The results from the questionnaires played a role in
guiding the discussion during the interview session to areas
that match the participant’s experience.
To analyse the interviews data, thematic analysis was cho-
sen as it best fits the exploratory nature of this study. It allows
for theoretical freedom, as it provides a flexible and useful
research tool, which can provide a rich and in depth account of
the data [7]. Thematic analysis focuses on identifying common
themes within the data. A theme is defined as a recurrent fea-
ture or topic describing particular perceptions and experiences
relevant to the research questions [30]. We adopt thematic
analyses with a mixture of deductive and inductive approach
to identify themes and analyse the interviews data [30]. While
deductive approach allows us to guide the flow of analysis
according to our aims and predefined generic themes from
the literature, the inductive analysis allows us to incorporate
additional themes that are new and arise from the data [31].
This allows us to generate findings from the bottom up in
order to be inductive and identify patterns based on participants
expressed reasoning. As opposed to using rigid pre-set criteria,
which may or may not map on to the participants perspective.
We began our analysis with initial coding using a deductive
approach by coding the data to a pre-defined set of codes
relevant to our research interest. These codes correspond to
the four themes described earlier, i.e., cybercrime incidents,
investigation process, investigation team, and technology. Then
through an iterative analysis approach the coder immerse
themselves in the data and assign new codes where appropriate
to the recurring ideas. Using this approach makes the findings
more robust as it allows us to test emerging themes against new
data. The coding process was carried out by a single coder,
and the analysis was performed using a qualitative analysis
software package called NVivo1.
An example of our coding process is shown in the quote
below, where the participant was asked about their impression
of utilising automated tools in their investigation of different
cybercrimes. This question falls under the technology and tool
support generic theme.
“I think fully automated tools need to be introduced into
our work. Purely because you know budget cuts. So there’s
going to be no more resources. So we need these tools, scripts,
data mining tools to go through everything we see.”
We initially assigned the code impression of automated
tools to highlight the participant’s views on the topic during
the first coding round. Then in our subsequent iterations,
we assigned the code drivers for automation and resources
availability as they also mentioned the lack of resources and
budget cuts as reasons for their views. Overall, we identified
35 codes in our data, that were then refined and grouped into
themes.
IV. RESULTS
Through the analysis of the interview data, we attempt to
understand different aspects connected to the process followed
when investigating different cybercrimes. Several themes ap-
peared across the interviews data that show how private and
public sectors carry out their investigations. In this section,
we first present the demographics of interview participants.
Second, we discuss results from the collected questionnaires.
These give us an idea regarding the expertise of the sampled
participants. Third, we report results from the interview anal-
ysis relating to the different identified themes.
A. Participants Demographics
We interviewed 10 participants who are experts in cyber-
crime investigations. The participants worked in government (6
participants) and private sector (4 participants). All participants
were based in the United Kingdom. Of the participants, 4 were
intelligence analysts; 2 were intelligence researchers; 1 was a
sergeant; 1 was a detective; 2 were law enforcement agents
dealing with cybercrimes (1 is currently working as a consul-
tant). The participants belonged to 5 different organizations,
2 private sector, and 3 government sector. The government
sector organizations tackled cybercrime at different levels,
including local, and regional forces. This allowed us to collect
the viewpoints from experts working at tackling cybercrimes
from different levels. The private sector organizations deal with
security investigations and intelligence gathering from open
and closed sources to provide clients with threat intelligence.
1https://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivo/home
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TABLE I: Participant Groups
Group ID Roles OrganizationType
G1 Intelligence analysts and researchers Private and Ex-Gov
G2 Cybercrime officers and detectives Government
G3 Senior intelligence analysts and researchers Government
G4 Senior cybercrime officers and detectives Private and Government
To ensure proper anonymization and to allow for better
protection of our participants identities we grouped them
into 4 groups based on their roles and level of experience.
Table I summarizes the different groups by providing the
Group ID (GID), the job roles of participants, and the type of
organization they have worked in (i.e., private, or government).
B. Questionnaires Results
The questionnaires were designed to collect data that can
paint a picture of the participants’ experience, role, types of
cybercrimes they investigated, and their technical capabilities.
We summarise the findings below and present a digest in Fig 2.
• Years of Experience: The average years of experience
participants had was 3.5 years working in investigating
cybercrimes. The minimum was 1 year and the maxi-
mum was up to 10 years of experience. They held roles
that ranged from intelligence analysts, consultants,
lead analysts, researchers, and investigation officers.
This generates multiple viewpoints and allows us to
gather requirements from different angles.
• Types of Cybercrimes: A list of different types of
cybercrimes were presented to the participants and
we asked them to select the crimes that they have
experience dealing with. The results were distributed
between cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes,
with the majority having experience dealing with
cyber-fraud, spam, hacktivism, and child pornogra-
phy. Additionally, participants noted that after the
2017 WannaCry ransomware, the numbers of reported
ransomware spiked and became the most reported
cybercrime.
• Role of Investigation: We asked if their involvement
with the investigation was part of the (1) detection
phase, (2) analysis, (3) mitigation techniques, (4)
policy formulation, or (5) derive approaches to address
crimes. The majority (around 70%) were mainly in-
volved in the analysis and mitigation of cybercrimes.
Additionally, around 50% of participants were in-
volved in the detection phase and in deriving different
approaches to address these crimes. Only 30% of
participants had a role in formulating cybercrimes
policies.
• Techniques Used: We asked the participants about
the techniques and experiences they adopt when in-
vestigating cybercrimes. Among the most common
techniques were OSINT (Open Source Intelligence),
social network analysis to study relationships and
interactions between criminals, and visual analytics.
Fig. 2: Participant Experiences with Cybercrimes
None of the participants reported that they use ma-
chine learning approaches in their investigations, and
only some reported using data mining techniques.
C. Understanding the Investigation Process
When asked about the process of intelligence gathering, the
majority of the participants agreed with the six steps of the
intelligence gathering cycle described in the literature [12].
However, the initiation of the intelligence gathering process
differs between the private sector and government sector
participants. This is due to the difference in nature between
the two sectors. In the case of the private sector, typically they
work with a client and start by collecting and understanding
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the client’s requirements. Thus, they are able to scope down
the task of gathering specific intelligence to answer clear
requirements. The process tends to take a top-down approach
where they formulate a hypothesis and then collect data to
prove it.
On the other hand, with law enforcement, the investigation
and intelligence gathering are initiated when they receive a
report that someone has been a victim of a cybercrime. In
such a case, the intelligence gathering process begins with a
bottom-up approach. Meaning they start from the collected
data, analyse it, and then try to formulate a hypothesis of what
happened based on the analysed data. Although the majority
of participants from the government sector emphasised this
“bottom-up” approach, one participant stated that they tend to
use mixed approaches. They may start with a hypothesis or
initial belief “bias” based on their experience and then look at
the data to either prove or dismiss the hypothesis.
“What I’ve done over time is, you will have your own kind
of biases or stereotypes in your head which guide you. Not in
like negative stereotypes but ones that help you. You’ve just
learnt from how you’ve gone before.”[G3]
When we asked participants about the differences between
investigating traditional crimes and cybercrimes, we received
a diverse set of opinions. Some felt that for cyber-enabled
crimes there are no differences and the same kind of detective
tactics would work. To them, it is still just a crime that
has been committed regardless of the means used. Thus, the
investigation process is basically the same.
“The fundamental thing is the majority of crime associated
with fraud or cyber is enabled crime. In other words, it’s
traditional crime that is just leveraged through a digital
device. Nothings changed, it’s the existing crime that has been
committed for centuries if not thousands of years.”[G2]
On the other hand, others felt that there are key differences
that the cyber aspect brings to the investigation. The main
differences mentioned by participants relate to the globaliza-
tion of cybercrimes, which restricts how far the investigation
may go due to jurisdictional issues. Another key difference
mentioned by participants is that cybercrimes compared to
traditional crimes tend to have less investigation leads 90%
of the time. This may be due to the sophistication of cyber
criminals in covering their online traces, or due to the lack
of cyber awareness from the victims. For example, they may
accidentally destroy digital traces and evidence, or report the
wrong information to the police.
When investigating a cybercrime incident, participants re-
ported that there are several factors that affect how this process
is carried out. These factors include, the type of crime com-
mitted (cyber-enabled, or cyber-dependant), who the victim is
(individual, small/medium business, large enterprises), type of
potential suspects (individual hacker or organized group), what
information or intelligence is available (investigation leads),
and existing resources available (human and technological
resources).
We asked participants about the use of OSINT during their
investigations, and the general consensus across participants
from different organizations was that OSINT is an important
tool for intelligence gathering.
“Open Source Intelligence is a massive tool for policing,
and it’s used across the board, not just by us, it’s used for all
sorts of things, so it is a technique that detectives are familiar
with.”[G4]
Participants stated that its importance comes from the fact
that suspects spend a lot of time online and have a large
presence either in social media or on the internet in general.
One participant stated that OSINT is not only valuable to the
cybercrimes investigations but even traditional crimes would
have benefited from using online sources to help with the
investigation.
“With some of the historic crimes we investigate, I think
we should have been doing more open source research side.”..
“I think open source intelligence has got a much bigger role to
play than any more traditional crimes and can be much more
successful, we can get a lot better results”[G2]
D. Collaboration and Investigation Teams
Participants across different organizations described sim-
ilar team structure and dynamics when investigating cyber-
crimes and gathering intelligence. Typically, a given case
will have a lead investigator and may have the assistance
of an analyst and a researcher to support the investigation.
Researchers are responsible for conducting regular monitor-
ing of different sources and preparing intelligence briefs for
analysts/investigators or clients. Analysts are responsible for
developing the intelligence products, identify trends related
to specific expertise and themes in cybercrime. For instance,
taking the volume data and make it presentable and useful
either to the lead investigator (and the court later on) or to
the client. Depending on the size of the department and the
available resources, the team may also include technical staff
that examine devices whether that is for victim or suspect.
Once these are reviewed, all the case data go to the analyst
who tries to evaluate it, challenge it, and pick it apart.
We asked participants about the typical technical and cyber
experiences of people working in each role. Most mentioned
that investigators and analyst do not necessarily come with
previous technical knowledge or background, however, they
would learn on the job the technical skills needed. This
phenomenon was true across all types of organizations, be it
private sector or government and police force.
“Some before they become cybercrime investigators, they
were all probably 6 to 12-year detectives, so they’ve been
dealing with burglaries and things like that. But there were
a couple that had programming backgrounds, and one had
worked in information security.”... “ The basis of it was getting
good detectives and good research and analyst skills and then
try to give them enough technical knowledge to do what they
need to do.”[G1]
Moreover, we wanted to understand how the collaboration
across departments and/or organizations happen when inves-
tigating a specific case. In the context of the private sector,
this was easily done through emails and online or in-person
meetings with people from different departments. Depending
on the size of the organization, teams would either all be based
in the same office, city, or they may be working with teams
based overseas. Either way, they reported that information
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sharing within and across teams was quite seamless and did
not present a struggle to their investigation process. Overall
therefore, these represented usable and efficient workflows.
On the other hand, participants from the government sector
had a different and more challenging user experience. The
flow of information and intelligence sharing from different
cybercrime units and agencies was a challenge. Participants
from different cybercrime force units mentioned that they often
have difficulties connecting information from a case they are
investigating with possible linked cases in other forces.
“So very little intelligence sharing happens within cyber-
crime. ... Getting stuff up from forces to regional units and
vice versa is a lot more difficult. ... Say you had an offence
down south [placeName] and you had an offence up north
[placeName] and they were connected, whether it be like a
suspect email address, the chances of connecting those two
offences, depending on what level it came in, could never
happen basically.”[G3]
This is particularly true for information sharing between
units at different levels (local force and regional force) as
well as between force units at the same local level. However,
the information sharing is currently better between force units
within the regional level. Moreover, one participant mentioned
that sometimes such linkage of cases may happen by chance.
“Because you have such a workload that you’d like to be
most of the time now identifying that something connected to
something else is purely based of an individual’s memory as
opposed to a system alerting. So those are the kind of next
steps we need.”[G3]
Another participant expressed the need for a connected
system across forces that is able to calculate such associations
between relevant cases.
“If we had the ability to share our data from our jobs and
their jobs and we had the analytical ability to be able to pick
out and go hang on a minute, their, our job links to that one
in [placeName]. Sometimes that linkage happens by virtue of
us having conversations but not you know automated.”[G4]
E. Technological Capabilities and Tool Support
Within the general theme of technological tools and capa-
bilities, participants reported that multiple tools are usually
used during investigations. Each of these tools is used to
achieve a specific task, such as data collection, analysis,
or visualization. When asked about the interoperability and
interactions between these tools, the majority stated that these
tools do not work well together. Instead, it requires significant
manual effort to extract the output of one tool and map it into
another tool for further analysis.
“They’re not necessarily as good at each part of the
investigation. Certainly, most of them have a focus at one point
of the investigation cycle. And then the rest might be add-ons
which are getting better but do not necessarily, see the job all
the way through as good as you’d like.”[G1]
Moreover, participants stated that sometimes they work
on different systems and networks, due to some corporate
regulations some tools are only allowed to reside within public
systems. Thus, different tools will be forced to sit on different
networks.
“They very much work in isolation, in most cases you
would use a tool, and say it was going to be the main
tool that I was using to build court products, it is great
for visualisation but there is very little in terms of labelling,
exporting, producing reports. So I might do all my working
outside that tool, narrow it down to the picture I want to show
and then manually map that in the tool.”[G3]
Participants from the government sector also mentioned
that there is currently no national mandate for the selection
of tools to be used within forces. Therefore, each police
force operates a different system and process, which adds to
the challenge of sharing knowledge and intelligence between
forces. This suggests a much larger issue with regards to
creating an efficient, effective and ultimately widely usable
cybercrime investigation process.
“Tools are not mandated nationally to each force, and if
it was a national infrastructure for a lot of these things then
that would be really helpful. It’s generally on a force by force
basis.”[G4]
We asked participants from government sector about how
the current police systems are being used to report cybercrimes.
Participants expressed that current police reporting system for
cybercrimes (called Action Fraud (AF) [32]) suffers from a
number of issues. AF is the UK’s national fraud and cyber-
crime reporting centre, which was initially designed for report-
ing fraud crimes specifically. The system was not designed for
recording cybercrimes and thus generates ambiguity for the AF
system users ( police officers or self-reporting victims) when
reporting these crimes. This leads sometimes to offences being
recorded under the wrong category.
“It was not really built to deal with cybercrime, and so
they had real issues in kind of categorising offences, and
when they get reported you have the victim knowledge being
able to accurately report it, and then we have the call taker
knowledge.”[G4]
Moreover, many details specific to cybercrime data are
not properly recorded and stored. This is due to the lack
of structured methods to collect the necessary cyber-related
information, such as IP addresses, bitcoin wallets, usernames,
and so on, which makes reports collected from different
victims differ in the level of detail. This has an effect on
how these reports are being searched and eventually leads to
missing links between crimes that may share similar details,
such as email or IP address.
“The police reporting systems themselves are not even
necessarily catered to record cybercrime offences. They have to
be kind of pushed in under a different category sometimes and
systems might be set up to record things like home addresses,
vehicle indexes and everything like that, but very little systems
are set up to record email addresses, IPs and everything like
that.”[G3]
Additionally, participants mentioned that there may be a
shortage in the number of call-takers within Action Fraud,
which has an effect on the number of cybercrimes that
gets assigned to different forces. Participants also mentioned
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complications related to the limited level of cyber knowledge
and experience in dealing with cybercrimes that initial call-
takers have. This leads them to misdirect crimes to the wrong
department which causes delays in responding to the crime.
Also, one participants perceived a link between how prevalent
cybercrimes are in the news to the number of crimes that get
communicated to them from the call-takers.
“One of the issues that we’ve identified within our force is
when a victim calls the Police, they get a really patchy response
as to how it’s dealt with because our call takers have a lot of
experience of dealing with reports of rapes and assaults but
when it comes to cybercrimes they do not really know what to
do so it often gets misdirected or delayed.”[G2]
We talked with participants about the implications of
using technology to automate certain investigation processes.
Many of them had some concerns regarding the automation
effects on the process, and expressed preference to perform
investigation tasks manually. Either due to lack of technical
skills, to re-validate previously obtained results, or for the fear
of missing some evidence that is relevant to the context they
are investigating. Nevertheless, participants from both private
and government sector emphasised that automating certain
processes may be necessary, but it should be done under human
control and guidance.
“ Automated tools can be useful for finding new data. I still
think, and may be it’s a cultural thing, but it still requires very
human element to it. I know the context of what we’re looking
for and I can interpret the messages and the chats that I’m
reading and pick up different things and bring it all together.
I might see something in one investigation, actually I realize
is relevant for another one.”[G1]
Including the human (user) in the process is particularly
important in order for them to understand the results produced
by the tool, and be able to trace back the process from the input
to the produced output. This is important because investigators
need to explain their findings to clients and to be able to defend
it in court.
“You do not want to use a tool and just feel like you are
just clicking a button” ... “If you are stood in court you want
to be able to explain what is happening behind that tool.”[G3]
We asked participants about what technical capabilities and
desirable tool features they think will benefit the way they
carry their investigations and gather intelligence. Government
sector participants all agreed that they need a substantial
upgrade in their IT infrastructure to be able to cope with the
sophisticated cybercrimes they investigate. This was not an
issue for the private sector. Additionally, both groups described
the need for more user-centred tools to allow them to easily
do their jobs, tools with better support for data visualizations,
and tools that can aid in analysing bulk amounts of online data
to cope with the evolving online ecosystem.
“We could be so much better with better technology, share
data, analyse data, be proactive with data. So an improvement
in technology would certainly assist us for the future. I think
we do things perhaps the long way and over time we could
improve on that.”[G4]
In summary, this section highlighted the main findings
gathered from the experts’ interviews. These are mainly spread
across topics related to the process of cybercrime policing, the
collaboration between investigation teams, and technological
capabilities of the investigators.
V. KEY CHALLENGES FACED BY CYBERCRIME
INVESTIGATORS
The literature from the criminology field discusses a
number of challenges facing the police when investigating
crimes. For example, some of the discussed challenges are
related to police patrol and organising hot-spot policing in
order to minimize numbers of street crimes [33]. Moreover,
Ratcliffe [34] argues that there is a need for a new shift in
policing from relying on old knowledge, which is relating to
the criminal activity that is typically collected in traditional
crimes, to a new knowledge, which is focused on the crime
event that is collected from public open source information.
While some of the challenges that are inherent within the
traditional crimes field transcend to cybercrimes, a number
of new challenges emerge that is linked to the cyber-world.
For example, cybercrimes are borderless by nature, thus there
are several legal and jurisdiction issues related to investigating
cybercrimes. In traditional crimes, the offender has a physical
link to the crime scene which makes the investigation and
detention easier. However, in cybercrimes, this is not the case.
Offenders may be in a different place, state, or country from
the victim. This makes cooperation across different agencies a
necessity.
Through the analysis conducted in this study we are able to
identify some key socio-technical challenges that cybercrime
investigators face. These challenges emerged from the themes
discussed previously and are grouped into four main topics: (1)
Reporting of Cybercrimes, (2) Information Sharing, (3) Tools
and IT infrastructure, and (4) Skills and Technical Abilities.
We discuss these further below.
1) Reporting of Cybercrimes: One of the main issues is
related to AF system and how it was initially designed and
used. The system users faces many ambiguities when record-
ing the reported crimes, which results in miss-categorizing
cybercrime offences. This leads to inconsistencies in the level
of details collected from victims, which typically depends on
how technologically-aware the victim is and the level of cyber-
experience held by the call-taker preparing the report. There
is also an increased likelihood of misdirecting the report to
the wrong department thus causing delays in addressing the
crime. It also increases the time and effort needed to conduct
the investigation. Additionally, the lack of structured methods
to collect the necessary cyber-related information, has multiple
implications on the investigation process, such as missing some
connections between possibly related victim reports. Overall,
a major review of the questions included in AF was felt to be
needed and appropriate training is necessary to better equip
call-takers to handle cybercrime related reports.
2) Information Sharing: One of the most significant chal-
lenges faced by law enforcement is the lack of centralised
coordination of intelligence sharing between forces and agen-
cies working on cybercrimes. This has multiple effects, firstly,
the intelligence products produced by forces may be incorrect
since they do not have the big picture and are not fully aware of
what crimes are being reported in different regions. Second, the
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lack of communication between different local forces results
in missing possible connections between different reported cy-
bercrimes. This makes establishing links between cases a real
challenge. Third, following up on specific cybercrime cases
and providing status updates either to the victim or the media
when requested, is difficult due to the lack of sharing case
information. This has a negative effect on the police reputation
and image as it may make them look incompetent in the eyes of
the public. Moreover, given that cybercrimes have a border-less
nature, unlike traditional crimes, they may involve suspects in
distributed locations. Therefore, having better communication,
coordination, and data sharing between different units and
forces will have a positive effect on mitigating and responding
to these crimes.
3) Tools and IT Infrastructure: A key challenge associated
with investigating cybercrimes is related to the level of IT
infrastructure available to police forces and the cyber capabil-
ities of investigators. In recent years there have been several
budget cuts that prevent forces from investing in upgrading the
IT infrastructure and acquire advanced tools. This limits their
capabilities and has effects on the efficiency and quality of
the conducted investigations. Similarly, investigators expressed
that a lot of the investigation time is spent doing manual
tasks that may be saved by utilising some automated or semi-
automated tools. Examples for such tasks include looking at
OSINT data to collect intelligence, analysing terabytes of data
from server logs and victim devices. Furthermore, the lack of
a national mandate of tools and systems to be used in cyber-
crime investigations adds another challenge for collaboration
between different cybercrime units. Police forces are generally
decentralized in the UK. While having a structure of separate
43 police forces [35] may be fit for policing traditional crimes,
this may not be the best structure for delivering effective
actions against crimes that are cross-jurisdictions (i.e., cyber-
crimes). This structure led each cybercrime unit to become a
silo, operating a different set of processes and tools and unable
to interoperate. Similarly, this interoperation issue also exist for
the different tools used, where a lot of the investigation time
is spent in manually modifying and formatting data to be able
to move it between different analytical tools.
4) Skills and Technical Abilities: Another challenge is
related to the cyber skills of the staff. There is a lack in the
number of skilled technical personnel working on investigating
cybercrimes. The majority are highly experienced investigators
who have been working with traditional crimes and are now,
because of the increasing numbers of cybercrimes, are moving
toward the cyber field. Investigators are highly trained in
gathering intelligence and investigation tactics but might not be
as well-trained in the cyber-world. There are, therefore, open
questions pertaining to employee training and expertise. This
is also unlikely to be a problem only faced in this geographic
area due to the widespread increase in cybercrime. Potential
avenues that may be explored going forward include further
training and upskilling for the necessary personnel, but also
creating tools that are better geared to supporting user skills
and activities. The ideal case will be the provision of practices
and tools that are easy to use and would reduce the learning
time for new cybercrime investigators.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this study, we interviewed participants from both private
and government sectors on their experience with investigating
different cybercrime incidents and the process of gathering
intelligence. The interviews were focused on four main themes:
(1) investigation process, (2) cybercrime incidents, (3) collab-
oration and information sharing, and (4) technology. Overall,
both groups agreed on the steps needed to gather intelligence;
starting with identifying the problem to address, collecting
relevant data and information, processing and analysing the
collected data to identify links and patterns, and finally dis-
semination step where the created intelligence is shared with
appropriate stakeholders. These steps are similar to what is
discussed in the literature related to the investigation and
intelligence gathering cycle [11], [12]. Although both groups
agree on the general process, there exist some differences in
the types of data they collect and use in the investigation. For
example, when gathering OSINT, law enforcement is more
restricted with the type of data they can collect and use in their
investigation. Participants mentioned that when tracking people
communication in online forums, any forum that requires a
login credential to access would be off-limits. Even if they did
access it, this data could not be used as part of the case and
will not be used in court.
With regards to the second theme, collaboration and in-
formation sharing, although this happens seamlessly between
different departments within a single private sector organi-
zation, sharing across organizations is not required as they
do have competing interests and do not tackle any national
issues. On the other hand, for government and law enforcement
sector it is completely the opposite as little information sharing
happens within local forces and across forces. Finally, for
the technology capabilities, again we see diverse responses
between the two organization groups. The private sector seems
to be more technologically advanced by having the supporting
IT infrastructure, the advanced tools, and the skilled human
capital. This might be expected due to issues around remu-
neration and specialisms, but has significant implications for
cybercrime investigations within law enforcement.
A. Recommendations
There is a number of challenges currently faced by cyber-
crime investigators working on government and private sectors.
Some of these challenges are inherent in the area of policing
traditional crimes and have transcended to cybercrimes. Others
are new challenges that emerged because of the way the cyber
space is designed. To overcome these challenges, we provide
the following recommendations:
• Cybercrimes reporting systems: Cybercrime victims
can use the Action Fraud (AF) online system to create
a report online, or they can report the crime by phone
where the report is created by a call-taker. Addressing
the issue of the poor quality of reported information
in the government sector that leads to misdirection of
some reports to the wrong department, a review and an
update to the current questions included in AF online
system is necessary. Moreover, a study and evaluation
of the usability and user experience of the online AF
tool is needed to identify the sources of ambiguity and
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areas for improvement. Additionally, it is necessary
to provide a way for updating and tracking the status
of each reported crime during the investigation cycle,
while providing AF call-takers and other relevant users
access to such updates. This will allow them to provide
prompt updates to any enquiring victims.
• Information sharing: A centralised coordination of
intelligence and partnership is required at a national
and/or international level to be able to share intelli-
gence and make effective use of resources. Having a
central system connected across forces will allow a
seamless flow of information between local, regional,
and national agencies dealing with cybercrimes. To
achieve this, further research is needed to facilitate
the exchange of intelligence in a secure and usable
manner across different systems and cybercrime units.
Additionally, it is critical to study and evaluate the best
architecture for information sharing across different
levels of cybercrime units; common options include a
hierarchical architecture (i.e., local unit connected to
regional, and regional to national) or a flat architecture
(i.e., having each cybercrime force unit connected to
the others). Additionally, designing appropriate access
control models is needed to facilitate the availability
of intelligence to those who require access to it while
maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of that
information.
• Tools and IT infrastructure: Current tools used within
the investigation process as suggested by participants
from both government and private sectors, sometimes
lack an important requirement that is related to the
transparency of the analytical process. Investigation
and intelligence gathering tools should be designed
with human-in-the-loop concept in mind. As an in-
vestigator, he/she needs to be able to understand how
the tool is working, and how particular results were
reached. This is critical to them as they need to be able
to explain their findings and defend them in court and
in other legal settings. To achieve this, the HCI and us-
able security research community need to investigate
how best to improve the user interaction and involve-
ment with intelligence tools. Additionally, the systems
and tools used in each cybercrime force unit should
be mandated nationally. This will facilitate a common
infrastructure of sharing of analytical capabilities and
linked intelligence. Furthermore, this will increase the
interoperability between different tools and systems,
and reduce the amount of incompatible tools currently
being used across different organizations. Finally, an
investment in upgrading the current IT infrastructure
in different cybercrime force units is necessary, to
allow investigators to have the capacity to analyse
the vast amounts of data being generated from these
crimes.
• System usability and human experiences: Many of the
investigators working in cybercrime from private and
government sectors come with experience in investi-
gation tactics associated with traditional crimes, and
may lack the technical skills. One way to address
this, is to provide more training, capacity building,
and awareness in cyber for law enforcement forces
(especially at the local-force level). Possibly a more
important point however is in improving nature of
systems and workflows (individual or collaborative) to
make them more user-centred and built to suit individ-
uals’ tasks. Increasing the usability of the cybercrime
investigation and intelligence systems is crucial as it
can reduce undue burden on the technical abilities of
workers. The ideal situation is for tools and workflows
to be designed to take advantage of investigators’
expertise and support them in cases where this may
need bolstering.
We believe that future research within this area needs to
focus on exploring these topics. In our future work, each of
these recommendations will be further explored and detailed
with the aim of providing a suitable framework to implement
them. This study is an exploratory study that provides a starting
point that exposes some assumptions and challenges faced by
practitioners. Additionally, given the small participant sample,
more work needs to be done for generalizability of the findings.
One way to achieve this is to utilise these findings to aid the
formation of questions that can then be put into a survey and
sent out to a wider audience.
B. Study Limitations
There are a few limitations to our research which should
be noted. When conducting semi-structured interviews there
are unavoidable variations in the level of details gathered
from each participant. Additionally, in order to understand the
problem in-depth and capture the views of participants with
their own words, we chose to conduct face-to-face interviews.
However, this limited us in the number of participants that
we were able to reach especially given that the targeted
community is considered hard-to-reach for academics. Simi-
larly, the sampling of participants was chosen from different
agencies (government and private) who deal with cybercrime
investigations. From the government agencies we were able
to gather the perspective of local cybercrime task forces
and regional cybercrime units. However, we could not get
access to participants at a national cybercrime agency level. In
future work, it would be interesting to include the views and
perspectives of experts from national cybercrime agencies, as
well as expanding our sample size to allow even more insight
into the problems faced.
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